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Introduction
Italy lost 1 million jobs over the 2008-2014 period as a result of a double deep recession.
As a consequence of its dualistic labour market structure, job losses were concentrated among youths and more generally people holding temporary job contracts. More recently, employment,
and more specifically open ended contracts, have started to rise (around 1 percent in 2015), albeit the still subdued GDP growth (a bit less than 1%). In this paper we test whether and to what extent this evolution can be imputed to two policy measures adopted in Italy at the end of 2014 and aimed at both reducing labour market dualism and stimulating job creation. The first is a sizable temporary rebate of non-wage labour costs which applies to all new permanent job contracts (hereafter PHI) offered to workers who in the previous semester had not an openended position. The incentives are not targeted to specific groups of workers nor conditional to firm-level net job creation and apply also to conversions from a fixed-term to an open-ended position. The second is a reshaping of the regulation of dismissals, aimed at reducing the level and the uncertainty of firing costs for all new permanent contracts in firms with at least 15 employees (the "contratto a tutele crescenti", or "graded security contract" hereafter CTC, part of a wider reform package denominated "Jobs Act").
We separately identify the effects of the two policies by jointly exploiting the different time dimension (one implemented since January 2015 and the other since March 2015) and the differences in the coverage of the two schemes, as the PHI applies to all firms but only to those workers with no permanent job position over the previous semester, while the new CTC regulation reshaped firing costs for all new permanent contracts, but only for firms beyond the 15 employees threshold. In order to do that, we exploit the administrative data for the Veneto region, which allow us not only to measure labour market flows (in the first half of 2015 and 2 years before), but also to reconstruct the previous labour market status of workers, to identify the firm matched with the workers and the firm's size.
It has to be stressed that there are relevant aspects of the two policies here not considered.
We do not discuss all the pros and cons of the design of the two policies, nor the general equilibrium effects that can derive from their implementation, like, for instance, the effects on labour supply. However, even with these caveats, our results show clearly that both policies fostered net job creation at the firm level, shifted the employment composition towards permanent job contracts and increased the workers' (permanent) job finding probability.
According to our findings the doubling in the monthly conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts observed in Veneto in the period January-June 2015 (from about 1 to more than 2%) is entirely due to the two policies, each policy contributing approximately one half to the total growth. On top of that, around 45% of gross hires with a permanent job contract can be imputed to the two policies. Disentangling the effect of the two policies, we find that hiring incentives (PHI) had the larger impact, contributing by 40 percentage points, with CTC only strengthening the impact of the PHI in the above 15 employees firms, such a combination of the two policies contributing for further 5 points.
An interesting result is in the impact of the two policies on firms' attitude to hire yet untested workers on either a permanent or a temporary basis. First, the reduction of firing costs introduced by the CTC enhanced the willingness of 15+ firms to hire workers who had never before worked for the firm. Second, the fact that PHI also applied to temporary to open ended contract conversions led on the contrary to a rise in temporary hiring 1 , as many firms still exploited the possibility to test workers through a temporary job spell eventually converting it into a permanent position later on.
The relatively small effect of the CTC on the level of employment is in line with the literature about the labour demand effects of a certainty equivalent change in firing costs. From a theoretical point of view, in a static model firing costs are just a tax on firing that is economically equivalent to a component of labour costs. If wages cannot adjust, an increase in firing costs implies a downward shift in labour demand and lower employment. Its relevance, however, may be limited by the fact that firing costs may be far away over time and needs to be discounted. In a dynamic context, higher employment protection dampens employment fluctuations as firms do not fully adjust labour input to economic shocks: most of the positive employment effects of a reduction (increase) in firing costs so would materialize in an economic upswing (downswing) and Italy in 2015 was far away from a cyclical upswing. So, most of the impact of firing costs is through its negative effects on the allocation of resources, a general equilibrium channel recently emphasized by Rodano, Rosolia and Scoccianti (2016) . As such, our paper adds to (and mostly confirms) the relatively rather scant empirical literature focusing upon the labour demand effects of firing costs. Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) , using state-level and time variation in employment protection legislation in the US, find that higher employment protection reduces employment flows. Adhvaryu, Chari and Sharma (2013) focus on rural India and relate supply-side shocks (like rainfalls) and different state-level employment protection legislation to show that employment protection reduces employment responses to shocks. In our paper we instead focus on a single Italian region, Veneto, before and after the inception of the new law on firing costs. As a consequence, our results are not affected by spurious local trends as in the above mentioned empirical papers.
More novel are our results about the effects on hiring of a reduction of both the uncertainty and the average expected level of firing costs. Actually, the CTC impacted mostly upon the high uncertainty stemming from the possibility that in the previous regime judges had to decide in favour of the worker mandating not only monetary reimbursement, but also the worker's reinstatement in the firm. Any effect of the CTC, albeit small, is likely to be driven by the effects of the reduction in the uncertainty about the possible firing costs.
Similarly, several papers have already analysed how firing costs shape firms' propensity to use fixed-term job contracts, not only to facilitate short-term labour adjustment, but also to screen workers and test the goodness of a job match before offering a permanent position (e.g. Faccini, 2013, Guell and Petrongolo, 2007) . However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has so far shown that a reduction in firing costs increases firms' propensity to offer a permanent position to workers not previously screened.
Concerning hiring incentives, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the Italian government introduces non-targeted, non-conditional hiring incentives. Cipollone and Guelfi (2003) analyze selective hiring incentives introduced in 2001 targeted to young workers hired on a permanent basis and do not find relevant effects on labour demand. Ciani and De Blasio (2014) consider instead a very short-term policy intervention for the conversion of fixedterm contracts into permanent jobs, introduced in Italy in 2013 and lasting just few weeks because of severe funding constraints. This incentive was targeted to females and young people and they find a positive effect of the policy on conversion rates. In 2014 the government introduced incentives to firms hiring workers on a permanent basis, but incentives were conditional to firms' net job creation. Given the very weak economic conditions, only very few firms applied for the incentives. Our results, instead, support the hypothesis of the immediate effectiveness of non-targeted non-conditional incentives on gross and net job creation, and in this respect are similar in spirit to the ones analysed by Cahuc et al. (2014) who find a positive and rapid expansionary effect of the non-conditional hiring credits introduced in France during Global Financial crisis. Our results are also in line with Neumark (2013) and Neumark and Grijalva (2013) who argue that non-targeted hiring incentives have a positive effect on employment during recessions, even if deadweight losses associated to these policies are generally large (e.g. Brown 2011 ).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the policy measures introduced by the Italian government in 2015 (hiring incentives PHI and the CTC introduced by the Jobs Act). In section 3 we describe our dataset. In section 4 we describe our estimation strategy. Section 5 present the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
The Italian labour market and the policies under scrutiny
The Italian labour market is heavily segmented in permanent and fixed-term workers. The dualism arose at the end of the nineties when the government progressively introduced different types of fixed-term contracts, to increase flexibility in the use of labour. Higher flexibility, however, was not accompanied by changes in firing costs for permanent job contracts.
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During the 2000s the share of fixed-term workers in total workers increased rapidly to around 13 percent. More than 60 percent of hires were made up of fixed-term job contract, used not only to face labour demand uncertainty, but also as a cheap screening device before hiring workers under a permanent contract. People employed temporarily suffered the most for the consequences of the Global financial crisis, when firms, facing a sudden drop in their activity, used all the available margins to adjust labour input. For this reason the first steps in tackling firing costs were made in 2012, by the law no. 92/2012, the so-called "Fornero Reform", followed in 2015 by the Jobs Act.
Before that, Italy was characterised by firing costs whose main feature was their uncertain and (potentially) high amount 3 . As such, dismissals were costless for firms if taking place on a just cause basis, i.e. workers mis-behaviour or firms' need to reduce or reorganize its workforce 4 . However, whenever a worker opposed and the court judged the dismissal to be unfair, the costs might become rather high, particularly in the case of firms with at least 15 employees. Firms with less than 15 employees could opt (according to the law no. 108/1990) between reinstating the worker and paying a pre-set severance payment (related to workers seniority and varying from 2.5 to 6 monthly pay). For firms with at least 15 employees, the general rule was that of workers' reinstatement. On practical grounds firms could side-step reinstatement by reaching private arrangement with the worker, the cost of it possibly being quite high, too.
The most critical aspect of this regime was the uncertainty in both the timing and contents of judges' deliberations, whose inclinations are deemed to have varied quite a lot across both time and space 5 . The widespread delays in the Italian civil justice are also likely to have compounded the inefficiencies as workers were lacking any income support (and pay) pending the litigation, whereas firms could end up having to pay quite high wage arrears if finally succumbing.
Most of the analysis made in Italy focused on the immediate effect of the regime discontinuity around the 15 employees threshold. There is evidence that the potentially higher costs affecting firms with 15+ employees may have somehow refrained firms' growth when firms happened to approach the threshold (see Schivardi and Torrini, 2008) . The effects, while statistically significant, were not economically very relevant, as the discontinuity in the firms' size distribution around the threshold is not as marked as the sharp discontinuity taking place for instance in France around the 50 employees threshold, relevant for the rules concerning the role of unions at the firm level (see e.g. Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen, 2013; Gourio and Roys, 2014) . Such a limited impact may however be due to measurement error in measuring firms' size, as actually there were ways to circumvent the stringency of the threshold, for instance by employing apprentices or other temporary workers whose presence in firms' workforce did not concur to determine the 15-employees threshold. Moreover, the general equilibrium implications of such a restraint to firms' growth might have been wider than what appears around the relevant threshold. This is the argument of Rodano, Rosolia and Scoccianti (2016) who show that removing uncertainty about expected dismissal costs could entail effects on firms' growth along the entire firms size distribution , whose relevance is likely to be compounded by the presence of other allocative distortions (they focus upon credit access distortions).
Removing these potentially high firing costs has been an hotly debated issue in Italy for over 20 years. Some attempts were made by both the first D'Alema government in 2000 and, more prominently, the second Berlusconi government, in 2002. The latter's policy initiative was 5 See Ichino (1996 All in all, the new regime reduces both the expected firing cost and, most significantly, the amount of uncertainty surrounding it for firms over the 15 employees threshold, with no change for those below the threshold 7 . It is not easy, however, to quantify the reduction in uncertainty in monetary terms; even assuming as a benchmark the case of risk neutral firms, it may depend upon the behaviour of local courts in terms of both judgment orientation and length of trials. The quantification of the reduction in firing costs may be further complicated by the presence of the above mentioned temporary regime with the tax free transaction option. This may have two different possible implications: on the one hand it directly reduces the cost for a firm of a dismissal which will be deemed as unfair by the judge; on the other hand it may stimulate the worker to resist (and the judge to deem as unfair) a dismissal which according to the now prevailing judgement criteria would be considered as fair, as its presence may provide for a low cost alternative to the full lack of compensation in case of no resistance (and no unfairness decision).
The government also introduced a very generous non-conditional hiring incentive. months. The incentive is a three-year exemption from social security contributions up to a threshold, which is quite high compared with the average contributions typically paid by firms to workers (according to the government's estimates the incentive should fully cover the social security contributions of almost 80 percent of new hires). Notice that also conversions from fixed-term to permanent job contract within a given firm are subsidized (conversions from apprenticeship are instead excluded as they benefit from an ordinary subsidy which is still in place).
6 The Jobs Act states that for firms with less than 15 employees firing costs cannot exceed 6 monthly pay with a minimum of 2 monthly pay (one per year of seniority). Before the Jobs Act firing costs varied from 2.5 to 6 monthly pay. Differently from Fana, Guarascio and Cirillo (2015) we believe that this change is negligible. 7 To be more precise, for those approaching the 15 employees threshold there is a reduction in the costs implied by overcoming the threshold as they are exempted from the implications of overpassing it. This is why, differently from Schivardi and Torrini (2008) we are considering not only firms close to the threshold in analysing the possible effects of the reform. For firms close to the threshold (say firms with 14 employees) the relevant discontinuity would be that with firms also below but much farther away from the threshold (say firms with 1 to 5 employees), for which no change was implied by the new law. However, focusing upon such a comparison would have implied looking at a much smaller subsample. Incentives are paid to firms of any size, while the CTC applies to firms with at least 15 employees; the incentives PHI apply only to workers with no permanent contract in the previous 6 months, while the previous status of the worker is irrelevant for the application of the CTC.
Thus, information about firm size and workers' past work histories, together with the precise date of the new contract, allow for separate identification of the effect of the two policies.
It has to be noticed that the fixed amount of the hiring incentive for all new permanent contracts signed in 2015 leaves a lot of room for firms' "strategic" behavior, since a firm may cash in the same amount for permanent contracts signed in both January 2015 and December 2015 (including conversions from a temporary to a permanent contract). It is well known that in a dualistic labour market structure, many temporary hiring are explained by a screening motivation. Whenever the quality of the match is uncertain -for instance because the worker is unknown to the firm -the latter may opt for a low risk path, as the worker may be hired on a temporary basis, tested and eventually later on transformed into a permanent position. Given the features of the PHI, such a strategy may be still preferable, as offering a temporary contract to an unknown candidate does not destroy her hiring incentive eligibility status. The temporary job contract still allows the firm to test for worker's skills and leaves unchanged the option to convert the fixed-term position into an open-ended one, benefitting from the PHI if the conversion occurs before December 31 st , 2015. In contrast, whenever the match with a given worker is positively valued by the firm because she was already known (for instance because she had held a temporary contract position in the past), there is an incentive to immediately offer a permanent contract. In this way the firm cashes in the incentive and prevents the risk that someone else offers the worker a permanent contract, removing her from the pool of workers eligible for the incentive.
The CTC may have an opposite effect, increasing the propensity to hire a worker unknown to the firm, insofar as the CTC has reduced the expected cost of firing her.
This has two consequences. First, the impact of both policies depends upon the presence of a previous knowledge of the worker by the firm 8
. Second, the PHI may boost not only permanent hiring (and conversions from fixed term to open ended contracts) but also temporary contract hiring, especially in those cases where testing workers' skills is relevant. This implies that the effect of the two policy measures introduced in 2015 may not be easily assessed by comparing the changes in the number of newly signed open-ended contracts and new temporary job contract 9 . This issue, however, is more extensively discussed in the next two sections.
The data and some evidence
In this paper we use administrative microdata about the so-called Comunicazioni
Obbligatorie. In Italy all occurrences concerning a job position must be electronically notified to the Regional agencies in charge of active labour market policies (and also made accessible to the Italian social security institute, INPS). Microdata archives, which cover only employees in the private sector and part of the public sector, are collected and organized by each Italian region. Potentially, the database registers when the position is created, destroyed, converted from fixed-term to permanent, or whether the duration of a fixed-term contract is extended.
Because of the decentralization of the data-collection process, the quality of the micro data differ quite a lot across the different regions. Our data refer to one Italian region, Veneto, characterized by high quality and high timeliness. Veneto is located in the North-Eastern part of the country. The weight of manufacturing in total economy is among the highest in the country, as well as labour market participation. On average, the weight of this region in total dependent employment is around 8 percent (excluding agriculture and Public Administration).
Our dataset contains information regarding all events (hiring, firing, conversion and fixed-term contract prolonged duration) occurred in Veneto between January 2013 and June 2015. This time span has been chosen because of data availability. Nevertheless, the exclusion 8 In a fully developed model, one should take care not only of the presence of a previous knowledge between the firm and the worker -which is a variable we may empirically proxy by looking at the presence of previous job spells of a given worker in a given firm -but also of the local labour market environment and the length of the job applicants pool which is available to each firm. The risk of having a worker transiting into a temporary position is that some other firms might offer her a permanent position removing her from the pool of those eligible to the PHI. The fact that our estimates look at only a few months and a unique region should allow us to neglect these further elements from the analysis. 9 The creation of temporary job contracts might be affected insofar as there are fraudulent arrangements between the worker and the hiring firm in order to "build up" the eligibility status of the worker by passing through a temporary contract. While -as shown by Veneto Lavoro (2015) -clearly fraudulent cases are present in the data, we believe that the quantitative amount of the extreme case here described is contained by the risk that the worker would have to bear by renouncing to a permanent contract in order to get the promise to obtain a new permanent contract in a different firm in 6-month time. As a matter of fact (see section 4) the job to job moves flow has remained quite unchanged over time.
of events after June 2015 allows us to avoid the potential bias induced by at least two confounding factors. The first is that in June 2015 the government introduced new limits to the use of collaborators, with potentially indirect effects on the use of other types of job contracts.
The second is that in October 2015 the government announced its intention to extend the PHI also to 2016. The amount of the incentive however has been reduced (from 100% to no more than 40% of total social security contributions) and the duration has been shortened (from 3 to 2 years).
For each event recorded in our dataset it is possible to uniquely identify both the firm and the worker involved. On top of the relevant anonymized (firm and worker) identifiers, we know the firm's size 10 (by size class) and sector of the activity and the worker's gender, birth-date, nationality. For each event we know the type of job contract, i.e. whether permanent or fixedterm. The latter group includes: (i) standard fixed-term dependent contracts, (ii) agency workers, (iii) apprenticesSecond, we also consider the firm-level panel dimension implicit in our dataset, i.e. the monthly flows (hiring and net job creation) originated by each firm in our dataset. We randomly select a closed panel of 5,000 firms followed from January 2013 to June 2015, among those firms hired at least one worker from 2013 to 2015. In this way we exclude firms entering or exiting the labour market during the period under consideration. For each firm we calculate celllevel flows. Each cell is defined by the intersection of year, month, the 6 types of job contracts and workers' past-working status, i.e. whether employed/non-employed with a permanent job contract in the previous 6 months. In what follows, for simplicity, we label the latter workers as "eligible for the incentive", independently on the year in which we observe them (i.e. even if we observe them in 2013 and 2014, when no incentive was in place for them). In other words, being "eligible" at the time of hiring means that the worker was not employed on a permanent basis in the previous semester. In case of contract conversions the "eligible" group excludes people with an apprenticeship job contract as these conversions were not covered by the PHI.
We calculate both hiring and net job creation at the firm-cell level. Net job creation is defined as the difference between hiring and job separations. We consider all types of job destruction, e.g. firing, workers' voluntary separation, retirement.
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Last, for the descriptive analysis, we consider aggregate flows. In Table 1 we report the total number of hires in each semester from 2013 to the first semester of 2015. In Table 2 we report the main socio-demographic characteristics (share of men, average age, share of "eligible") of workers involved in the various labour market flows, which indeed are quite similar across different groups (also when calculating each share separately for each year). 13 As for hiring, the eligibility condition for people separated from their job -necessary to compute cell-level data-is defined by looking at the labour market status at the time of hiring.
As already mentioned in Section 2, firms have the possibility to hire a worker on a fixedterm basis, test her skills and then convert the contract into an open-ended (still benefitting for the incentives and the CTC). This two-step strategy is in principle always convenient for the firm whenever the worker has not a better alternative (and insofar as the PHI does not decreases or vanish, as after December 2015). The only risk for the firm stems from the fact that the worker may have a better alternative and, if offered a permanent contract by another firm, may disappear from the pool of eligible workers. Given that we are analysing a single region and a relatively short period of time, we are not attempting to take account of these "local labour market" effects. What we may however consider is the fact that, ceteris paribus, the propensity to use such a two-step strategy is larger whenever the firm does not know the worker's characteristics. We proxy such a feature by distinguishing between two types of matches between workers and firms: those involving workers who were already employed in the same firm in the past (we label this group as "known workers") and those who are matched with a firm for the first time (workers "unknown to the firm"). The upper part of Figure 3 plots the flow of new job contracts, by worker-firm relationship. The solid line refers to contracts involving workers and firms who were never matched before; the dashed line refers to matches involving workers already known to the firm. The flow of new hires of known workers increased considerably in January 2015, when incentives were introduced and then declined.
The flow of new hires involving unknown workers peaked instead in March 2015 and increased also after April. The bottom part of Figure 3 plots the share of known workers in total hires of permanent workers and confirms that after the introduction of the PHI in January 2015 firms preferred to hires workers whose skills were already tested in the past.
As a first step, we first check differences in trends before and after the inception of the two policies, by comparing eligible vs. non eligible workers (in Figure 4) and firms of different size (in Figure 5) , independently of the job contract type. Even if the comparisons are affected by monthly seasonality, in Figure 4 the difference in the trends of eligible and non-eligible workers is never significant before January 2015 and then differs afterwards. In Figure 5 , instead, we do not find clear-cut evidence of a change in trends after the inception of the Jobs Act in March 2015.
Notice however that the presence of the above depicted two-step strategy implies that the number (or the share) of new hiring (or conversion from fixed-term contracts) into permanent positions is not a sufficient statistics to be looked at, as the policy interventions might have boosted also temporary hiring. To identify the effects of the two policies, we need to identify a "control" or non-treated group of events totally unaffected by them. This means focusing upon events in small firms (as such unaffected by the CTC) by workers who were neither immediately nor prospectively eligible for the PHI. People belonging to such control group are the workers transiting from a permanent position in a small firm to another permanent contract in the same firm class-size. Their job-to-job transitions are driven by the materialisation of a better match, mostly because of idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to any labour demand shifts related to the PHI or the CTC. The evolution of these flows might be due to business cycle features, as a more buoyant economy normally triggers them. But this is precisely what one would like to control for by comparing the evolution of the other flows, potentially affected by the two policies, and the control group evolution.
Thus, in Figure 6 we report the flow of hiring of non-eligible workers in small firms (which, as reported in Table 1 , amounts to around 5 percent of total hires in all the years here considered) and the difference between its trend and the trends in some other relevant flows.
More in detail, panel (a) of Figure 6 reports the difference in trends of eligible and non-eligible 
The estimation strategy
The charts in previous sections show that there are discontinuities in the trends of hiring along some of the dimensions affected by the two policy measures here considered, and that the picture is very complex, as the policy measures may have impacted more than one labour market flow. In particular, the two-step strategy of offering a temporary position first and then convert it into a permanent contract -so as to test the worker's skill and still cashing in the whole amount of the PHI -may have boosted also temporary contracts. Broadly speaking, a possible measure of the counterfactual business cycle evolution unrelated to the two measures may be obtained by focusing upon those labour market flows unaffected by the two measures, permanent hires of non-eligible workers from January to February 2015, and permanent hires of non-eligible workers in small firms from March 2015 on.
In order to get a more precise and quantitative assessment of the effects of the two policies we estimate a diff-in-diff model at two different levels: individuals 14 and firms.
The first exercise looks just at conversions of fixed term contracts into open-ended. This is a flow directly affected by both policies, although along different lines, depending upon the workers' previous history (defining the eligibility to the PHI) and the firm size (relevant for the CTC). More specifically, we will look at the probability, for a worker who is holding either an In a second exercise we look at workers' probability of obtaining a permanent job. Our sample includes all people "at risk" of finding a permanent position, i. permanent job, we drop the worker from the sample after she finds a permanent job (unless she after some time she re-enters the pool of job seekers because separated from her job). 18 Fully exploiting the worker's past history, we can also split the sample among those who are not employed at a given time and search for a job and those who have a fixed-term job.
The third exercise looks at a similar phenomenon, but from the firm's perspective: permanent gross hiring. Also this flow is affected by the two policies along different dimensions, depending upon the workers' previous history (defining the eligibility to the PHI), and the firm size (relevant for the CTC). Again, the evolution of the flow of non-eligible workers and in small firms provides the relevant control group. More formally, for each firm we identify a number of cells defined by the intersection of 30 months, 2 worker's past conditions (depending upon the workers' history during the previous semester and defining eligibility from January 2015 onwards) and 6 contractual types (open-ended contracts, standard fixed-term dependent contracts, agency workers, apprentices, collaboration workers and internships).
We then estimate:
[2] n igofwym = γ i + γ g + γ o + γ f + γ w + γ y + γ m +
where γ i indicates firm i-th fixed effects, γ o is the fixed effect for permanent job contract , and γ f is a set of fixed effects, one for each of the 5 types of fixed-term contracts (the other fixed effects are the same as in equation [1] The last and final exercise tries to get together the firm's and worker's sides of the market by looking at the changes in employment (net hiring). We estimate equation [2] but the dependent variable is now net hiring at the firm level, equal to hiring minus firing.
The results

Temporary to open-ended contract conversions
We start in Table 3 with conversions from fixed-term to open-ended contracts. Notice that the inclusion of worker fixed effects allows us to control for the fact that many people have had several temporary employment spells (and practically all of them have had the chance of being converted to a permanent contract over several months). The effect of hiring incentive PHI is positive and sizeable in column 1. The effect of the CTC is positive and significant in column 2 and also in column 3, when the interaction with the PHI is included. In the last case, however, the interaction is not different from zero, suggesting a larger effect of the CTC for non-eligible workers, namely apprentices. All the effects are sizable when compared to the average size of the monthly probabilities of conversion, reported in the last row of the table.
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Permanent contract gross hiring
We now look at permanent hiring from both the perspective of the worker and the perspective of the firm. Table 4 presents the results for the probability that an unemployed or a fixed-term worker obtains a permanent job position, given her characteristics. The first column of Table 4 refers to all individuals (i.e. non-working or working under a fixed-term job contract), Columns 2 and 3 report the same estimates distinguishing workers by their initial status (out of employment, working with a fixed-term contract); so, column 2 identifies the effect of incentives on the flow from non-employment into permanent employment, while column 3 is the worker's perspective about the conversion rate from temporary to open ended contracts already examined in table 3 (however and differently from that table, here also passages into permanent employment implying a change from one firm to another one are included in the count). The results confirm the positive effect of incentives, which is extremely large when compared with the average probabilities observed in 2013/14 (reported in the last row).
We then estimate equation [2] , which refers to gross hiring made at the firm level. The inclusion of firm fixed effects allows us to control for average firm-level hiring, which can depend on unobservable firm-specific characteristics. In some specifications we also split the dummies D (o)(w=1)(y≥2015) and D (g=15+)(o)(y≥2015)(m≥March) into two groups to identify the effect of the two policies on workers already "known" to the firm, i.e. those for which there is lower uncertainty about the goodness of the job match. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5 . Notice that the effect of the two policies is obtained by using hiring of non-eligible workers in small firms as a control group (firm size matters from March 2015 onwards).
Both policies were legislated before being actually implemented. So, our identification strategy based on the timing of their implementation might fail whenever firms have strategically moved back and forth already planned hiring in order to exploit the announced 19 As a robustness check in Table A1 we report the same estimates as in equation [2] , but estimated at the cell-level. The dependent variable refers to the number of conversion from fixed-term and apprenticeship to open-ended contract. The first column refers to conversion of non-eligible workers (so the cells under exam are 60 out of the total 120) and it is aimed at identifying the effect of the CTC by comparing cells pertaining to firms above and below the 15 employees threshold. Non-eligible workers are those with an apprenticeship job contract or were employed with a permanent job contract in the previous semester. The effect of CTC, mostly identified by transitions from apprenticeship, appears to be positive and statistically significant. The second column includes also the cells measuring the conversions involving workers who did not have a permanent contract in the previous semester (whose conversion does allow to cash in the PHI). It allows to identify separately the effect of the CTC and PHI and their interaction. While positive, the CTC still positive and close to be significant (p-value equal to 13 percent), while both the PHI and the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant at standard levels.
policies. In order to take account of such a possibility we exploit the fact that the PHI was The first column reports the effect of incentives only, which, is positive and highly significant. As expected the dummy capturing possible anticipating behaviour of firms is negative and significant, but smaller in absolute terms, suggesting that hiring incentives indeed had a total positive impact on hiring. The second column adds the dummy capturing the effect of the CTC which is positive, significant but remarkably smaller than the effect of hiring incentives. The own effect of CTC vanishes when we consider the interaction between the two policies, as in column 3, while the interaction term is quite large. So, most of the CTC effect appears to have acted by strengthening the effect of the PHI in the large firms segment.
Column 4 and 5 split the effect of incentives PHI (column 4) and CTC (column 5) by type of worker, i.e. whether "known" or "unknown" to the hiring firm. PHI boosted the chance for both workers, but, as expected on the basis of our discussion of the two steps strategy for exploiting the PHI, the increase is larger for the "known" ones On the basis of these estimates, the last rows of Table 5 report the size of the estimated impact of the two policies. According to our estimates around 40% of total permanent hires occurred in the first semester of 2015 are due to hiring incentive. These hires correspond to around 20% of total hires in the period. The effect of the CTC, while sizable, is quantitatively smaller and equal to 5% of total hires of permanent contracts and 1% of total hires (including also other types of contracts). When excluding job-to-job flows the impact of the two policies on newly created jobs is even higher.
The employment dynamics
We now look at net job creation at the firm level, as defined by gross hires minus job separations 22 . Following equation [2] , n gofwym now represents the number of jobs created in each cell net of the number of jobs destructed in the same cell. The estimated coefficients, reported in Table 6 , represent the increase in the average size of the cell, due to the policies. that cannot be captured by a closed panel as the one used in columns 1-3. The results of this exercise are fully consistent with the ones presented in the first columns.
To assess the quantitative relevance of these results, as in Table 5 , in the bottom part of the Table we report some back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of the two policies on net job creation. According to our estimates, workers hired because of PHI account for more than 40% of total net flow of permanent workers, while the effect the Jobs Act is smaller (around 5%). They also account for 35% and 4% of the net flow of newly created dependent employment positions, in all the specifications (also when the unbalanced panel is considered).
Moreover, if we look at the difference between the net flow in 2015 and the average net flow in 2013-14, we find that this difference is totally explained by the two policies.
It is not possible to extrapolate these results to Italy as a whole, as both the underlying trends and composition effects may differ by geographical area. Focusing on Veneto, our estimates imply that in the first semester of 2015 both policies increased the number of people employed with a permanent job contract by 0.7 percent.
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We have carried out several robustness checks. First, since also the apprenticeship job contract has been subject to several legislative changes during the period under analysis, we have carried out the same regressions presented in Table 5 and Table 6 , but excluding apprentices. Results, available upon request, are unaffected. As an additional check, in some estimates we exclude from the sample those firms around the 15-employees threshold, as their behaviour might be impacted by the CTC through additional channels. Also in this case the results are qualitatively similar.
Conclusions
In this paper, using a diff-in-diff strategy, we analyse the reaction of firms to two policies introduced in the first part of 2015 by the Italian government, aimed at both reducing labour market dualism and favouring job creation. The first is a generous hiring incentive to firms offering open-ended job contracts, not conditioned to firms' net job creation. The second is the reduction of firing costs for firms with at least 15 employees (not only a monetary reduction, but also a decrease in uncertainty about the consequences of unfair dismissals). We find that the two policies were successful in both reducing dualism and stimulating labour demand, even during a recession period characterised by very high macroeconomic uncertainty.
As already said, our estimates do not consider all the relevant aspects relevant in judging the appropriateness of the measures undertaken (see Brown et al., 2011 , for a wider theoretical discussion on hiring subsidies). In particular, we do not discuss the pros and cons of the current temporary and rather unselective hiring incentives vis-à-vis the host of often cumbersome but permanent and more selective subsidies targeting specific groups of workers supposed to be weaker and less employable (mostly youths and long term job seekers). Furthermore, we do not deal with the merits and pitfalls of having incentives for gross hiring so that also the normal turnover taking place in a firm is incentivized insofar as people are hired through a permanent contract. The combination of the two elements implies that the policy favours the conversion of temporary contract into permanent ones and possibly the poaching of suitable temporary workers from one firm to another. So, an indirect effect of the hiring incentives might be that of lifting up the temporary hiring of people whose contract is later on transformed into a permanent one. At the moment we can only testify both an increase of the probability to find a permanent position for both non-employed and temporary workers in other firms, and an increase in the temporary-to-permanent contract conversions within the same firm.
Our estimates also fall short of an overall evaluation of the new firing rules introduced by the Jobs Act. As a matter of fact, the CTC has left unchanged the general principle that only dismissals opposed by the worker and considered unfair by a judge have to be compensated.
Differently from the previous regime, the reinstatement of the worker, while still possible, applies only to few and better specified cases of unfair dismissals (the ones deemed to be discriminatory). Also the uncertainty concerning the amount of the financial compensation possibly stemming from a judiciary intervention has been considerably lowered as its amount has been capped and pre-specified by the law as an increasing function of worker seniority.
Furthermore, the compensation cost for firms has been halved if the worker accepts a transaction, so ending any pending litigation, whose acceptance is favoured as the compensation so obtained is cashed tax free. The new regime is likely to provide more certainty to both the worker and the firm. At least for the time being, i.e. the three years over which the above mentioned tax exemption has been granted, it may induce an higher share of dismissals to end up with some compensation (the risks of high compensation costs has been reduced, but the firm may still find more convenient to avoid any risk at all by offering the tax exempt transaction). Our estimates do not allow to consider all these specific shifts, whose relevance will increase over time as the stock of employees will be increasingly made up by people hired according to the new rules. Neither we are able to consider to what extent the tax exemption is relevant and the possible effects of its removal in the future.
Furthermore, our estimates do not consider the overall general equilibrium implications of the reduced uncertainty and average amount of the dismissal costs for the firm. Albeit small, the effects of the firing costs reduction might have significant general equilibrium effects, for instance if their allocative effects may cumulate to other market imperfections (e.g. capital market imperfections) in shifting the whole firms' size distribution.
All in all, our estimates are therefore only one of the elements necessary to decide what to do in the future, concerning the possible presence of selective work incentives (i.e. incentives targeted to population groups considered less easily employable) and the tradeoffs between marginal tax wedge reductions (i.e. tax cuts applied only to either gross or net hiring) and tax wedge reductions applied across the board (i.e. inward shifts in the tax schedule facing the whole stock of workers). We however believe that our empirical exercise is a step forward for the comprehension of the reaction of firms to changes in employment protection and in its interaction with changes in other labour cost components.
We show that both measures were effective in both shifting employment towards permanent contract and raising overall employment levels. The predominant component has to be attributed to the sizable incentive provided by the law, with a strengthening of such an impact in the 15+ employees firms thanks to the new CTC which reduced the average cost and the uncertainty concerning possible future dismissals. A relevant longer run effect of the CTC comes from the fact that it made firms less reluctant in hiring on a permanent basis a yet untested worker.
All schemes of incentives provide money for events which economic agents might have decided anyway to put in place, so that their unitary budgetary costs are higher than what formally provided for each individual event. The PHI made no exception to such a rule. There is evidence that firms of shifting back and forth planned hires in order to exploit the timing of the temporary incentive provided by the law and; furthermore, firms acted "strategically" also along other lines as, given the fact that workers eligibility to the PHI was related to the absence of a permanent job in the previous semester, the firms continued to offer only a temporary position to all the yet unknown job applicants, postponing the chance of cashing the full amount of the (1) (1) Net job creation is the difference between job created and destructed. employed with an open-ended contract in the previous 6 months (i.e. non-eligible for PHI in 2015) and unemployed or employed with a fixed-term job contract in the previous 6 months (eligible for PHI in 2015). Thousands in the upper panel and differences in monthly hires between the two groups in the bottom panel. The small vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. Differences are normalized by using the pre-treatment average. (1) (1) Differences in trends are derived by an OLS estimate of hires on a set of separate monthly dummies for eligible and non-eligible workers. Robust standard errors. Differences are normalized by using the pre-treatment average. (1) (1) Differences in monthly hires are derived by an OLS estimate of hires on a set of separate monthly dummies for the two groups compared in each panel. Robust standard errors. Linear probability model. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the person finds a permanent job position and 0 otherwise. The model in column (1) includes also a dummy for the condition at time t-1 (whether employed temporarily or not employed). The second column refers to people moving from unemployment into a permanent employment; column (3) refers to transitions from fixed-term to open-ended job contracts in another firm within the same month. Effect of both policies 1 Linear probability model. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the number of hires made by each firm. For each firm we identify cells measuring the number of hires of workers with given characteristics made by the firm. Each cell is defined by the intersection of month (from January 2013 to June 2015), type of contract (6 categories), eligibility to PHI (as defined in the text), size of the firm (smaller than 15, 15+), and past relationship with the firm (worker known, unknown) in columns 4 and5, only. Difference between total hires and job-to-job flows in column 6. Linear probability model. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the difference between the number of hires made by each firm and the number of job separation in the same cell. For each firm we identify cells measuring the number of hires and job separations of workers with given characteristics made by the firm. Each cell is defined by the intersection of month (from January 2013 to June 2015), type of contract (6 categories), eligibility to PHI (as defined in the text), and size of the firm (smaller than 15, 15+). Unbalanced panel of 50,000 firms in column 4. 
